



No animal is an island, entire of itself. With the exception 
of the last living dodo, any animal lives in a world where 
there are others like itself — members of its own species, 
with which it might cooperate or compete, and the only 
group from which it can find an effective breeding partner. 
Conspecifics are a distinct and important part of an animal’s 
environment, even if it is not a member of a notably social 
species. So important that specific cognitive mechanisms 
have evolved for interacting with others of the same species 
— for recognising them, communicating with them, learning 
from them, understanding what they are up to... These 
mechanisms are the subject of the burgeoning field of social 
cognition, the focus of a CellPress ‘LabLinks’ meeting held 
at Birkbeck College on 3rd December 2010, arranged by 
Stavroula Kousta (Trends in Cognitive Sciences), Meredith 
LeMasurier (Neuron) and me, with academic organizers 
Chris and Uta Frith (University College London).
Social cognition is not confined to social animals, but one 
reason why many are so fascinated by it is the observation 
that, among vertebrates at least, those species with 
particularly large brains (for their size) are often the more 
social members of a group — for example, anthropoid 
primates, corvids or cetaceans. This led to the ‘social brain 
hypothesis’, which speculates that an important factor in 
the evolution of large brains was their requirement to deal 
with the complexities of life in a group. At the meeting, Lars 
Chittka (Queen Mary University of London) pointed out that 
this seeming correlation is far from true in the insects, where 
eusocial species can form social groups of staggering 
size. If you consider the ‘mushroom bodies’, parts of the 
insect brain implicated in learning and memory, variation 
in their size shows no clear relation to sociality. Indeed, the 
solitary ancestors of social bees and wasps grew larger 
mushroom bodies when they evolved a parasitoid lifestyle 
~100 million years before becoming social — perhaps 
because of the cognitive demands of central place foraging, 
brood care, and prey identification. While one can argue 
that the large brains of some social mammals might reflect 
the particular complexity and subtlety of their interactions, 
the interactions between individuals in eusocial insect 
societies can also be quite sophisticated — for example, 
there is evidence for individual recognition, based on 
facial markings, that is important in the maintenance of 
dominance hierarchies in wasps.
Anyone with a child, particularly a teenager, will be well 
aware of the way they readily pick up modes of speech 
and behaviour from their peers. Social learning is a 
powerful force, and Chittka pointed out that, again, it can 
be seen in insects, the example given being consensus 
building in swarming honeybees, where “scouts” return 
to the hive with information about potential new nest 
sites. A returned scout communicates information about 
possible new sites — and does so with an enthusiasm and 
determination that reflects its confidence that the site will 
be a good new home. The sum of the activities of all the 
returning scouts can be represented as a vector, which 
varies in length and direction over time, gradually building 
to a consensus on where to swarm to find the best 
available new nest site.
EditorialSocial learning is the basis of traditions and culture, and 
in his keynote presentation at the meeting Andrew Whiten 
(University of St Andrews) focussed on the evidence for 
cultural learning in apes and what this can tell us about 
the evolutionary foundations of our own extraordinary 
cultural propensities. This evidence has come from both 
field studies and experiments in captivity, showing that 
populations differ, for example, in the way they use tools 
to obtain food, and that many differences are not due to 
genetics or local ecology, but to the way individuals pick 
up local habits and modes of behaviour from observing 
others. There is now abundant evidence for such cultural 
learning in chimpanzees, for example in how stick-tools 
are used to procure otherwise inaccessible food sources. 
There are interesting contrasts with humans, however — 
human children are great direct imitators, closely copying 
the actions of demonstrators, whereas chimpanzees tend 
more to ‘emulate’, focussing on the desirable results of 
actions rather than directly copying them. There is also 
limited evidence for the ‘ratcheting’ up of traditions in 
apes — the gradual build up of complexity as additional 
features are invented and transmitted to others. And it 
seems that teaching, where one individual makes an effort 
to support the development of skills in another, hardly 
occurs in non-human apes (there is more evidence for 
teaching in predators, like meerkats), whereas of course it 
can be of great importance in human learning.
Some proponents of the ‘social brain hypothesis’ have 
emphasised the notion of ‘Machiavellian intelligence’ 
— the idea that it can be advantageous for an individual 
in a society to understand what others know and ‘think’ 
and potentially to be able deliberately to influence others’ 
knowledge and behaviour. This was touched on by Chris 
Frith in his introductory talk, where he mentioned the 
important concept of ‘Theory of Mind’ — having an idea 
about the minds of others, and using that to interpret and 
predict, and perhaps manipulate, their behaviour. This 
may seem a very human trait, but there is evidence for 
such attributions in some other species, for example, as 
explained by Nicky Clayton (University of Cambridge), 
in corvids which hide food caches for the future. These 
famously clever, large-brained, social birds have a 
remarkable ability to remember where they have hidden 
huge numbers of food items. One danger they face is from 
thieves — other birds who see where they have hidden a 
food item, remember this, and then grab it for themselves 
when the cachers have left the scene. This has led to 
some remarkably complex cache protection tactics on the 
part of the birds that hide the food. They use distance, 
shade and barriers to reduce the likelihood that the 
observers will be able to accurately see where they have 
hidden the food and even know when to conceal auditory 
information, namely when the potential thief can hear 
but cannot see. Furthermore, if they notice another bird 
seeing them cache food, they can wait until the other bird 
has gone, and re-cache the food in new locations that the 
potential thief does not know about — fascinatingly, this 
is done by birds that have been thieves themselves in the 
past, but not by naive birds, suggesting that the behaviour 
is based in some sense on an extrapolation to another 
individual of a propensity they ‘know’ they themselves 
have. In short, it takes a thief to know one. This kind of 
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presented evidence that young children of two years of 
age have great difficulty projecting their own experience 
of seeing or not seeing to infer whether Mummy does or 
doesn’t know.
Social information of this kind is clearly very important 
in humans, and insights into the brain mechanisms 
involved were described by Matthew Rushworth 
(University of Oxford). He described an experiment where 
the subjects made a choice that would potentially lead 
to a reward, where the choice was informed by a social 
partner with a suggestion of variable truthfulness. On 
the basis of their experience over a number of trials, the 
subjects learnt the level of honesty of their partner. By 
functional magnetic resonance imaging of brain activity 
during the experiment, regions of the brain could be 
identified that seem to be important in making such social 
predictions. And by using a technique known as ‘diffusion 
tensor imaging’, which essentially measures biases in 
the diffusion of water molecules that correlate with the 
presence of neural tracts, information can be gained 
about connected networks of brain regions that operate in 
social learning — the new data presented by Rushworth 
implicate connections between the paracingulate and the 
posterior superior temporal sulcus cortex.
More basic functions have been ascribed to the role of 
‘mirror neurons’ in social cognition — neurons that fire 
when a particular action is either observed or performed 
by an individual. The mirror neuron system has become a 
subject of great, but rather contentious, interest in social 
neuroscience, a controversy touched on by James Kilner 
(University College London). An early view was that such 
neurons, first described in the macaque brain, are part 
of a system for understanding the goals or intentions of 
an action. Others argue that there is little hard evidence 
for this, and that it is more likely they have a ‘lower 
level’ function in sensorimotor learning. Kilner discussed 
evidence for and against mirror neurons functioning in 
action understanding, but I think it is clear there is a 
long way to go before we have a definitive answer to 
the question of what these enigmatic neurons are really 
doing.
Problems of social cognition are thought to underlie 
certain important behavioural disorders — notably, autism. 
In particular, individuals with autism are thought to be 
poor at understanding the mental states of others — to 
have a deficit in Theory of Mind. Francesca Happé (King’s 
College London) presented evidence that autism may also 
involve a decreased ability to understand one’s own mind 
—  that autism is also a disorder of self-awareness or 
“Theory of own Mind”. This challenges the commonsense 
notion that we know our own minds directly, while 
inferring what others may be thinking. Instead, 
experimental and neuroimaging evidence suggests that 
similar representational mechanisms allow us to know 
our own and others’ thoughts. Thinking of autism as a 
developmental disorder of self-awareness may open the 
way to new interventions for social disability.
Somewhat more malign behavioural problems can 
result when people fail to show normal understanding 
of, and responses to, emotional states of others — when 
they exhibit callous and unemotional traits that can be 
associated with psychopathy. Essi Viding (University 
College London) described work on psychopathic tendencies in children, in particular evidence for a strong 
genetic influence on those antisocial children that also 
show callous and unemotional traits, the ones particularly 
in danger of becoming psychopaths as they grow up. Her 
group has been looking for brain anatomical correlates of 
such behaviours, with early indications from imaging that 
an increase in the grey matter in the cingulate cortex is 
associated with callous and unemotional behaviour.
A related set of antisocial behaviours collectively known 
as conduct disorder can emerge either early in childhood 
or in adolescence. It has been suggest that early-onset 
conduct disorder has a distinct neurodevelopmental 
basis, whereas the adolescent-onset variant is a learnt 
behaviour based on copying deviant peers. Andy Calder 
(MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge) 
presented neuroimaging data, using a tractography 
technique related to that described by Matthew 
Rushworth, implicating in particular a brain tract known as 
the uncinate fasciculus, and, surprisingly, this was seen in 
both early and late-onset conduct disorder.
This issue of ‘nature versus nurture’ in social cognition 
was further addressed by David Skuse (University College 
London), who reported a twin study using game theory 
to look for the most heritable aspects of cooperative 
behaviour. In games where the subjects can cooperate, 
or be spiteful — reducing other’s rewards for no personal 
gain — it was the latter, negative trait that showed most 
evidence of heritability.
But it is clear that the social behaviour of individuals 
can be influenced, for good or bad, something that 
naturally exercises the minds of policy makers throughout 
the World. Ben Seymour (University College London) 
described how policy makers are looking to social 
neuroscientists for news as to how positively to influence 
human behaviour. It remains to be seen to what extent 
detailed neurophysiological data can be put to good use 
by government, but it is clear that behavioural insights 
can be remarkably effective at ‘nudging’ people to behave 
well. Seymour introduced his talk with a striking example: 
simply by painting a fly on the inner surface of a male 
urinal, the level of spillage in public gents’ toilets was 
dramatically reduced. More realistically, a recent report 
by academics at Imperial College and the Institute for 
Government (‘Mindspace’), essentially a handbook on 
how to apply insights from behavioural science and social 
cognition to public policy, has generated genuine interest 
amongst policy makers in the UK.
The meeting showed, I think, that those working on the 
various aspects of social cognition in diverse species, 
from humans to other apes, to birds and insects, have a 
lot to say to each other – and perhaps it will nudge them 
to communicate with each other a bit more.
Geoffrey North
Further reading from Current Biology
Clayton, N.S., and Emery, N.J. (2007). The social life of corvids. Curr. Biol. 17, 
R652–R656.
Frith, C.D., and Frith, U. (2005). Theory of mind. Curr. Biol. 15, R644–R645.
Frith, C.D., and Frith, U. (2007). Social cognition in humans. Curr. Biol. 17, 
R724–R732.
Keysers, C. (2009). Mirror neurons. Curr. Biol. 19, R971–R973.
Frith, U., and Happé, F. (2005). Autism spectrum disorder. Curr. Biol. 15, 
R786–R790.
Laland, K.N. (2008). Animal cultures. Curr. Biol. 18, R366–R370.
Leadbeater, E., and Chittka, L. (2007). Social learning in insects – from 
miniature brains to consensus building. Curr. Biol. 17, R703–R713.
